CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE WORK AREA FOR WORKRELATED

PURPOSES

AND

SEIZURE

OF

PERSONAL

PROPERTY

DOES NOT VIOLATE FOURTH AMENDMENT-O'Connor v. Ortega,

480 U.S. 709 (1987).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause."' In the 1960's, the Warren Court interpreted the fourth amendment in a way that resulted in greater
protection for defendants.- Near the end of Chief Justice Warren's tenure, however, urban violence, unrest on college campuses, soaring crime rates, political assassinations and criticism
of the Court resulted in a noticeable erosion of defendants'
rights." Subsequently, the Court began to restrict many important decisions that bolstered defendants' rights. 4 It created an
array of exceptions to the fourth amendment and its exclusionary
rule, 5 the result being that "reasonableness" and "probable
cause" developed into two distinct standards for scrutinizing the
validity of searches and seizures." Indeed, it appears that the
I U.S. CONSr. amend. IN,.
2 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (lewd books and pictures which were
unlawfully seized in defendant's home were inadmissible as evidence because the
exclIsionary rule of the fourth amendment is applicable through the fourteenth
amendment).
:1 Note, [he I 'ired States Suprente Court Erosion of Fourth Aimendment Rights: The
Teiend Conlinues, 30 S.D.L. R:v. 574, 575 (1985).
4 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (magistrate mav issue warrant based
on totality of the circumstances): )elaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (officers
may stop a car based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause).
5 The exclusionary rule was originally limited to federal proceedings and was
first applied by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
It is a remedy created by the judiciary which supplements the fourth amendment by
excluding evidence from a defendant's trial if i! is obtained through an illegal
search and seizure. Note, sipra note 3, at 579. In recent years, however, the effectiveness of this rule has been diminished by the Court. See Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983) (reasonable belief that suspect is armed and dangerous may justily a search for weapons in a vehicle's passenger compartment despite that the
suspect is no longer inside the vehicle); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980) (search and seizure of a defendant by l)rug Enforcement Agency officials
deemed reasonable despite being based solely on suspicions perpetuated by the
use of drug couricr profiles).
'' See note, supra note 3, at 575. Advocates of traditional interpretation believe
that the warrant clause governs fiirth amendment searches and seizures, thus making the reasonableness clause of secondary importance. See, e.g., LANDYNSKI,
1019

1020

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:1019

Court manifested a commitment to give greater deference to
public officials at the expense of individual liberties.'
The judicial tendency to limit the scope of the fourth amendment is exemplified by the 1986 decision of O'Connor v. Ortega.'
In O'Connor, the Court limited the number of situations where a
public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
office, including his desk and file cabinets, and provided public
employers with greater latitude when conducting a search of such
property. ' Magno Ortega, a physician, was employed as Chief of
Professional Education at Napa State Hospital (Napa), a public
facility located in the state of California.'" Ortega was responsible for supervising new physicians that were participating in the
hospital's psychiatric residency programs." In July 1981, Ortega
was investigated for allegedly mismanaging his department.
Napa officials became concerned over Ortega's improper acquisition of a computer for the residency program.' 3 In addition,
charges were made that Ortega had sexually assaulted two female
employees and that he had subjected a resident to wrongful disciplinary action.' 4
On July 30, 1981, Ortega left the hospital for a two-week
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-

PRETATION 42-44 (1966). As a result, authorities must demonstrate to a magistrate
that probable cause exists in order to attain a search warrant. See I W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 548-49 (2d ed.
1987). Probable cause is found when a reasonable person would infer from the
facts and circumstances that a felony was committed. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). The "reasonable person" test views the fourth
amendment's two clauses as operating independently. See Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 282 (1984). Consequently, searches may be reasonable, and thus constitutional, even if executed
without a warrant. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("nothing in the [f]ourth [a]mendment ... requires ... searches be
conducted pursuant to warrants.").
7 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
8 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
') See id. The holding in O'Connor is hardly novel given the fourth amendment
line of decisions. The tendency has been to grant greater discretion to public officials despite the negative impact on correlative individual freedoms. See Note, supra
note 3, at 586.
I Ortega v. O'Connor, 764 F.2d 703, 704 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 480 U.S. 709
(1987).
'I O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 712.
12 Ortega, 764 F.2d at 704.
13 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 712.
14 Id. The officials suspected that they were misled into believing that the computer was donated, when in fact it may have been financed with the coerced contributions from residents. Id.
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vacation while these allegations were being investigated.' 5 It
was, however, requested by Dr. Dennis O'Connor, the Executive
Director of Napa, that Ortega refrain from returning to the hospital property until the conclusion of the inquiry.' 6 After his vacation, Ortega was placed on administrative leave pending the
investigation's outcome.' 7
Employees selected by Dr. O'Connor conducted a search of
Ortega's office.' The hospital officials later contended that the
search was made in accordance with a hospital policy of executing "a routine inventory . . . in the office of a terminated employee.""'
At the time the search was conducted, however,
Ortega was neither terminated nor scheduled to leave his position at Napa. -' Moreover, Napa did not have a policy of conducting an inventory of the offices of those employees on
administrative leave. 2 '
Although the officials conducting the search knew that
Ortega had moved the computer to his home, 2 2 the search of his
office was extremely thorough.2 '3 The officials searched through
some of Ortega's personal belongings and appropriated several
items for investigatory purposes.2 4 An inventory of the office was
never prepared. -5 Instead, all office papers were placed in boxes
15 Id. Dr. O'Connor originally suggested that Ortega take paid administrative
leave for the duration of the investigation but, as an alternative, permitted him va-

cation time. Id.

14 Id. Dr. O'Connor had asked Ortega not to return to the premises without his
written approval. Ortega, 764 F.2d at 704.
17 Ortega, 764 F.2d at 704.
I O'Comior, 480 U.S. at 713. This panel included "an accountant, a physician,
and a [hiospital security officer," and was headed by the Hospital Administrator.
Id. It was the Hospital Administrator who made the decision to enter Ortega's office. Id. Dr. Ortega had occupied his office for seventeen years, had his name on
the door, was locked when he was not present and no one else had a key. Ortega,
764 F.2d at 704.
1'.O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 713.
20 Ortega, 764 F.2d at 705. Ortega was simply on administrative leave until the
conclusion of the investigation. Id.
21 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 713.
22 Id. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun emphasized that "the record demonstrates . . . that ensuring that the computer had not been removed from the
Ihlospital was not a reason for the search." Id. at 735 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 713.
24 Ortega, 764 F.2d at 704. Among the items seized were "a Valentine's card, a
photograph, a book of poetry all sent to Dr. Ortega by a former resident physician
•..[as well as] billing documentation of one of Ortega's private patients under the
California Medical program." O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 713. Some of these articles
were later used in a hearing to impeach a witness who testified on Ortega's behalf.

id.
25 O'Connor, 480

U.S. at 714.
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and stored for Ortega to retrieve. - Ortega was eventually terminated on September 22, 1981.27
Ortega subsequently filed suit against various hospital officials in the United States District Court under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act, -' claiming that the search of his office violated
the fourth amendment.29t Both parties moved for summary judgment and the hospital's motion was granted.? On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals affirmed in
part and reversed in part after concluding that Ortega possessed
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office.'' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari' and reversed the appellate court's decision."" The Supreme Court remanded the
case, instructing the district court to determine both the validity
of the search and seizure as well as the reasonableness of the inception and scope of the search.: 4
The Warren Court's policy of liberally interpreting the
fourth amendment for maximum protection of defendants' rights
was initially established in the 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio." ' In
26 Id. The investigators made no attempts to separate Ortega's belongings from
government property because, as one agent emphasized, "[tIrying to sort State
from non-State ....was too much to do, so I gave it up and boxed it up." Id. at
713-14 (quoting Joint Appendix at 62, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 707 (1987)
(No. 85-530)).
27 Id. at 712-13.
28 Id. at 714. Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Ierritorv or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other property proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Ortega also brought "pendent state claims for invasion of
privacy and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealings." Ortega, 764 F.2d at
705.
2! Or/ega, 764 F.2d at 705.
:0 O'Comnor, 480 U.S. at 714. The District Court, relying on Chenkin v. Bellevue
Hosp. (enter. 479 F. Stipp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), found that the search was necessary to secure state property within the oflice. Id.
:1I Orelga, 764 F.2d at 706-07. The Court of Appeals held that the record justified a grant of partial summary judgment for Ortega on the issue of liability for an
unlawful search, and it remanded the case to the District Court for a determination
of damages. Id. at 707.
:2 474 U.S. 1018 (1985).
: : O'Connr, 480 U.S. at 714.
31 Id. at 729.
:35367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Mapp, the appellant was convicted in an Ohio state court for possessing lewd and lascivious materials in violation of an Ohio
law."" The evidence used to obtain this conviction, however, was
seized after police officers forcibly entered Mapp's premises and
conducted a search
of her personal belongings and papers with7
out a warrant.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary
rule of the fourth amendment is applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 8 Justice
Clark, writing for the majority, reiterated that the fourth amendment applies to "all invasions on the part of the government and
its employe[e]s of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life.""'" Justice Clark advocated a liberal interpretation of the
constitutional provisions relating to personal security." He emphasized that the courts must guard against attempts to encroach
on citizens' rights. 4 Moreover, the majority noted that federal
and state cooperation will be served best by adherence to the
same criteria.4 - The Court reasoned that to rule otherwise would
Id. (citation omitted).
"47 Id. at 644-45. At the time of the search, Mapp had demanded that the authorities show her a search warrant. Id. at 644. An officer then presented a paper which
he claimed to be a valid warrant. Id. At trial, however, no warrant was produced by
the prosecution. Id. at 645. The state, relying on lWo/f v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), asserted that the fourteenth amendment did not prohibit admission of evidence appropriated by unreasonable search and seizure if state proceedings and
state crimes were involved. See id. at 645-46. The Ohio Supreme Court implied
that the articles might have been illegally seized, but they nevertheless, were
deemed admissible because "there was no evidence that any of the incriminating
evidence . . . was taken from defendant's person by the use of brutal or offensive
physical force against defendant." Id. (quoting State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427,
431, 166 N.E.2d 387, 390 (1960)).
'8 Id. at 655-57. The Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court, and on
reexamination of the factual grounds on which the Supreme Court decided Wolf v.
Colorado acknowledged that the 1l'o/f court had recognized "the enforceability of the
right to privacy against the Isitates," but found the case's failure to require state
application of the exclusionary rule unacceptable. Id.
"- Id. at 646 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). In Boyd,
the Supreme Court voided an act designed to amend customs revenue laws. Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617 (1886). The revenue law permitted the judiciary to require that defendants produce their private books, invoices and papers in
court during a revenue controversy. Id. at 618. The Court concluded that the act
was repugnant to the fourth and fifth amendments. See id. at 638.
40 .1/app, 367 U.S. at 647 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635
(1886)).
41 Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
42 Id. at 658. Justice Clark emphasized this need to adhere to a single standard
with regard to the fourth amendment and its exclusionary rule by pointing out that
a double standard, one state and one federal, would mean that "a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence illegally seized, but a state's attorney across the
3
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create a dual standard which would reduce the fourth amendment to "a form of words.""
Six years after Mapp, the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court recognized that a search warrant was not necessary
when the burden of obtaining a warrant "is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search."' 44 Camara involved a
suit by a homeowner who was charged with violating a provision
of the San Francisco Housing Code.4 5 The homeowner refused
to allow building officials to conduct a warrantless inspection of
his dwelling.4 " He subsequently sought a writ of prohibition arguing that the search could only be conducted pursuant to a warrant procedure, and that a warrant could only be issued when
there was probable cause to suspect that a given building contained housing code violations. 47 The United States Supreme
Court rejected the homeowner's contention that specific probable cause was necessary to search a given dwelling. 48 The majority reasoned that a warrantless code inspection of a place is
reasonable if there is probable cause to believe that violations
exist within the general area and if the need to search transcends
the resulting invasion of privacy. 4" According to the Court, a determination of probable cause may be based on a dwelling being
effected by the legislative and administrative requirements under
the given municipal program being enforced. 5" The Court concluded that while the probable cause standard might have been
satisfied, the homeowner, nonetheless, had a constitutional right
to require that the inspectors procure a warrant. 5' The Court
found that, in this case, there was no emergency that required
street may, although he supposedly is operating under the enforceable prohibitions
of the same [aJmendment." Id. at 657.
43, Id. at 648 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
392 (1920)).
44
45
46
47

387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
Id. at 525.
Id.

Id. at 525, 534. The writ was denied by the California Superior Court, and on
appeal the order was affirmed by the District Court of Appeals. Id. at 525.
48 Id. at 536-38, 540.
49 Id. at 536-38. The Court cited several factors that tended to justify these area
inspections, among them being the longstanding acceptance of such inspections by
thejudiciary and community, the public interest in alleviating dangerous conditions
and the minimal invasions of privacy that they perpetuate. Id. at 537.
5o Id. at 538. The Court suggested that factors capable of perpetuating probable
cause would-be "the passage of time, nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family
apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but . . . not . . . specific

knowledge of the condition of a particular dwelling." Id.
51 Id. at 540.

19883

NOTES

1025

immediate access.
Shortly after its holding in Camara, the Supreme Court, in
Terry v. Ohio," adopted the balancing-of-interests test to satisfy
the requirement of probable cause.5 4 Terry was convicted of
possessing a concealed weapon in violation of an Ohio law. 5 5 At
trial, the prosecution entered into evidence two revolvers and
several bullets which had been seized from Terry and a codefendant. 5" The evidence was obtained when a detective stopped
and frisked Terry and the codefendants after suspecting that they
were about to commit a robbery.5 7
In affirming the conviction, the United States Supreme
Court construed the fourth amendment to allow a police official
to conduct a limited search for weapons on a criminal suspect
without probable cause. 5' The Court balanced the government's
interest in making the search against the privacy interests of the
citizen. 519 The majority observed that the reasonableness of a
search and seizure will depend on whether the action was justified at its inception, and if its scope was appropriate in light of
the surrounding circumstances." Accordingly, the Court concluded that where police officers suspect criminal activity they
must be afforded latitude to permit a reasonable search for weapons to assure the protection of the officer.!"
5'2Id. No emergency was apparent because inspectors had taken three trips to
the dwelling in order to get the appellant's permission to conduct a search. Id.
53 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
54 Id. Canmara merely established a less stringent probable cause test and instituted a subjective "balancing-of-interests" test for determining the extent of fourth
amendment protection. See Caimara, 387 U.S. at 540.
5 7errv, 392 U.S. at 4 & n.1 (citation omitted). The state court of appeals affirmed the convictions. Id. at 8.
56 Id. at 5. The officer removed guns from the overcoats of petitioner Terry and
Richard Chilton, one of the co-defendants, and no weapons were found on Katz,
the other co-defendant. Id. at 7. Terry and Chilton were prosecuted together. Id.
at 5 n.2. Thev retained the same attorney, and made a motion to suppress the
firearms. Id.
57 Id. at 6-7. The officer was suspicious after observing that the three suspects
were "scouting" a storefront window in a covert manner. Id. at 6.
58 Id. at 27.
59 /d. at 20-21.
60 Id. at 19-20. The Court emphasized that the police officers must be able to
present "specific and articulable facts" which can justify the intrusion when considered in the aggregate. Id. at 21.
"! Id. at 27. Chief Justice Warren pointed out that "the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man ...would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger." Id. Consequently, "due weight must be given ...to the
specific reasonable inferences ...[drawn] from the facts in light of [personal] experience." Id. See also Ybarra v.Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (police officer is al-
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One week later, in Mancusi v. DeForte,"2 the Court announced
that employees, under certain conditions, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their offices against entry by the police.6 3
The Court apparently extended the reasonableness standard to
the workplace by implying that an employee does not have an
expectation of privacy within his office against entry by superiors
and fellow workers.6 4 Mancusi involved a police search of the office of Frank DeForte a teamsters' union officer who was convicted of conspiracy, coercion, and extortion through misuse of
his position."5 Union documents from DeForte's office were admitted into evidence at trial and he was convicted."" The police,
however, had gained access to the union office and took the documents without a warrant."' The Supreme Court held that employers have standing to object to searches of their offices."'
Despite the fact that DeForte shared the office with others, the
lowed to execute a pat down search for weapons when he reasonably believes such
weapons may be on a criminal suspect).
62 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
"3 Id. at 369.
64 See id.
65 Id. at 365.

Id.
Id. The police searched the offces and seized the documents after the union
had refused to comply with the County District Attorney's subpoena duces tecum.
Id. In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit concluded that DeForte had standing to challenge the introduction of the evidence since his right to privacy was violated. United States v. Mancusi, 379 F.2d 897, 905, aff'd, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). The Court of Appeals
emphasized that "[wihile much has been written on the [fjourth [a]mendment's
guaranty of the individual's right to be secure in his 'home,' it is now well established that the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to one's
place of business as well." Id. at 903.
68 Ilancusi, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968). The Court decided to hear the case to
determine whether respondent had standing to challenge the admission of evidence against him and whether the search was "unreasonable" under the fourth
amendment. Id. at 367, 370. In examining the standing issue, Justice Harlan first
explained that the fourth amendment protection extends to commercial premises.
Id. at 367. Second, the Justice posited that the fourth amendment protection is not
limited to the people who hold title to the premises. Id. Justice Harlan pointed out
that the legal possession requirement was dismissed as a prerequisite to standing in
fourth amendment cases in Jones v. United States. Id. at 369 (citingJones v, United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 265-67 (1960)). Consequently, the Justice stated that anyone
legitimately on the premises where a search occurs has standing to challenge its
legality when evidence obtained from the search may be used against them. Id. at
368; see also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
In Jones, the defendant was the occupant in an apartment where the owner had
given him a key. Id. at 259. Police searched the apartment while Jones was present
and found narcotics in a bird's nest lying outside one of the widows. Id. While
Jones had less of an expectation of privacy in the area where the nest was found, he
nonetheless had standing to challenge the search. Id. at 267.
66
67
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Court recognized that it was a private area where he was "entitled to expect that he would not be disturbed except by personal
or business invitees, and that records would not be taken except
with his permission or that of his union superiors. ' 6 9 Consequently, the Court concluded that the warrantless entry by the
police was unreasonable.7 °
In 1983, the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Lafayette 7' utilized
the reasonable cause standard to justify warrantless inventory
searches incident to an arrest.7 2 Lafayette was arrested for disturbing the peace and was taken into police custody. 7' A warbag was made in order to
rantless search of his shoulder
inventory his possessions. 7 ' The search produced ten amphetamine pills. 75 Lafayette was charged with violating the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act. 7" After a pretrial hearing, however,
the trial court ordered that the pills be suppressed. 77 The sup69 Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369. Justice Harlan concluded that DeForte had a reasonable expectation that only these workers, or personal or business invitees would
have access to the office, and that his papers would be left undisturbed unless these
employees or union superiors consented to their appropriation. Id.
70 Id. Justice Harlan rejected the state's argument that the warrantless entry was
justified as falling within the exception to the requirement outlined in Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). Id. at 370.
71 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
72 Id. Since 1968, lower federal courts, under the auspices of the Supreme
Court, have attempted to expand on the implicit admission within 'lancusi that an
employer may have a right to reasonable entry and control over office materials by
adopting a policy that any work-related search by an employer is feasible under the
fourth amendment if reasonable cause exists. See United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d
I111 (7th Cir. 1973) (surveillance undertaken by Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
agents to determine whether an IRS employee was violating a conflict of interest
statute deemed permissible under the fourth amendment because the investigative
activity was substantially related to the employee's job responsibilities); United
States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1975) (conviction of postal worker for
theft of packages held valid despite that the conviction was based on postal inspectors seizing such packages during a warrantless search of an employee's locker; this
search was executed after postal inspectors had reasonable suspicion and the locker
was subject to "regulation of inspection" as condition of employment, and such
searches were bargained for under labor union contract).
73 Id. at 641. The arrest took place at approximately 10:00 p.m. near the town
Cinema in Kankakee, Illinois. The respondent had been involved in a dispute with
the theater's manager. Id.
74 Id. at 64 1-42.
75 Id. at 642.
76 Id. See i.t.. REv. STAT. ch. 56 1/2 ch. 1402(b) (1985). The statute provides in
part that "itis unlawful for any person knowingly to possess a controlled or counterfeit substance." Id. at § 1402. An individual violating this act by possession of
"any controlled or counterfeit substance is guilty of a class 4 felony." Id. at
§ 1402(b).
77 Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 642. At the pretrial hearing, the state unsuccessfully
argued that the shoulder bag search was permissible tinder South Dakota v. Opper-
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pression was affirmed by an appellate court,"8 and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari."' Thereafter, the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded.8"
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, determined that
a warrantless inventory of Lafayette's personal effects prior to incarceration was permissible under the fourth amendment. 8 ' The
Court reasoned that the search was a "routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person. 81 2 Observing that the
justification for the search was not based on probable cause, the
Court concluded that the warrantless search was reasonable police procedure which served a legitimate government interest.8"
The Chief Justice asserted that there was "no need to consider
the existence of less intrusive means of protecting the police and
the property in their custody." 8 4
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). Id. In Opperman, the Supreme Court held that a police
inventory of the contents within an impounded automobile, when done pursuant to
departmental procedure, does not constitute an unreasonable search which violates
the fourth amendment. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376.
78 People v. Lafayette, 99 Ill. App. 3d 830, 425 N.E.2d 1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
The appellate court reasoned that a suppression order was appropriate because the
officer did not fear for his safety during the search, and that the preservation of the
suspect's property as well as defenses to claims of lost or stolen possessions could
be attained in less intrusive ways. Id. at 835, 425 N.E.2d at 1386. The state
supreme court denied discretionary review. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 643.
79 459 U.S. 986 (1982). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether police officials have the authority to search the personal possessions carried by an individual who has been placed under arrest. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at
642-43. The Court found that this was necessary because this question constantly
presents itself to law enforcement officials and police in the execution of their duties. Id. at 643.
80 Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 649. The Court remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its holding that the inventory search was reasonable under the fourth
amendment. Id.
81 Id. at 648.
82 Id. at 644.
83 Id. at 646-48. The Court observed that intrusion on an individual's fourth
amendment rights must be balanced against the government's interest in disarming
criminal suspects and obtaining evidence. See id. at 644 (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (police officers may search a suspect who is
under arrest, and are not limited by standards governing a protective frisk of the
person which is inherent to an investigative stop). The Court asserted that inventory searches serve to prevent suspects from injuring themselves or others with
personal items while being detained and also deter false claims, stealing and careless treatment of possessions taken from arrestees. Id. at 646.
The ChiefJustice then concluded that a police officer may search areas within
an arrestee's immediate control. Id. at 644. See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969) (police officers may conduct a warrantless search of areas where weapons or evidentiary items might be found without violating the fourth amendment).
84 Id. at 647. See aLo United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
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Two years later, in New Jersey v. T.L.O. ," the Court applied
the reasonable cause standard to condone the search and seizure
of personal property by public officials unaffiliated with law enforcement. A high school teacher discovered T.L.O. and another
girl smoking in a campus lavatory."' Since smoking violated a
school rule, the teacher escorted the students to the office of
Theodore Choplick, the Assistant Vice Principal. 7 T.L.O. subsequently denied that she had been smoking and as a result,
Choplick demanded to inspect her purse." Opening it, he discovered a pack of cigarettes and rolling papers."9 Choplick continued to search the purse and discovered items which implicated
T.L.O. in marijuana dealing."" Choplick turned this evidence
over to the police and the state subsequently filed charges against
T.L.O. ' " T.L.O. sought to suppress the evidence by arguing that
Choplick's search violated the fourth amendment. ' The juvenile
court denied this motion and sentenced T.L.O. to a one-year
probationary period.' The lower court's decision was later va85

469 U.S. 325 (1985).

86 Id. at 328.
87 Id. Smoking on campus violated a provision of the school's handbook. Id. at
377 n.16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88 Id.
81) Id. Choplick would not have noticed the rolling papers if he had not removed
the cigarettes. See id. In his experience, rolling papers are closely related to the use
of marijuana and as a result he suspected that further examination would reveal
more proof of drug use. Id.
0 Id. These items included some marijuana, a pipe, several empty plastic bags,
an amount of cash in one-dollar bills, a list of students who apparently owed T.L.O.
money and a couple of letters suggesting that T.L.O. was involved in drug dealing.
Id.

91I Id. at 328-29.
9"2 Id. at 329. T.L.O. also sought to suppress a confession which she had given

claiming that this confession was inadmissible because it was the product of an unlawful search. Id.
93 State ex el T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 343, 425 A.2d 1327, 1334 (Law Div.
1980), vacated, 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (App. Div. 1982) (per curiam),
rev'd, 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983), rev'd, 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The court
found the search to be reasonable. Id. at 342-43, 428 A.2d at 1334. According to
the court when the teacher witnessed T.L.O. smoking, the school official was obligated to investigate and thus was justified in searching the purse. Id. at 343, 428
A.2d at 1334. The court concluded that because Choplick saw the marijuana and
other related articles, it justified a complete search of the purse. 1d.; Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (no warrant required for police seizure of car
registration which was admitted into evidence and led to conviction of defendant,
because the discovery of the card was not the result of a search, but of a custodial
inventory); State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 243 A.2d 240 (1968) (no warrant required for examination of fingerprints on hubcap because it was seized as instrument of crime and thus not a search within fourth amendment protection).
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cated by the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division"4
and then reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court." 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to examine the appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy
for searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by
public school authorities.""" Reasoning that the fourth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and that school officials are state agents, the Court
determined that the fourth amendment applies to searches executed by public school officials. 7 Justice White, writing for the
majority, rejected New Jersey's assertion that fourth amendment
restrictions applied only to law enforcement officials. ' The Justice observed that the fourth amendment had been applied consistently to the activities of state officials in both criminal and civil
cases.:" The Court rejected the argument that the in loco parentis doctrine'
excluded school officials from the purview of the
fourth amendment.'"
The Court, addressing the degree of suspicion required to
justify a school search, concluded that the fourth amendment requires a balancing of the state's need to search against the poten94 State ex rel T.L.O., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 280, 448 A.2d 493, 493 (App. Div.
1982) (per curiam), rev'd, 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983), rev'd, 469 U.S. 325
(1985).
,95 State ex relT.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 350, 463 A.2d 934, 944 (1983), rev'd, 469 U.S.
325, 348 (1985).
96 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 327.
97 TL.O., 469 U.S. at 333-37. In reaching this conclusion, Justice White cited
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette, the
Court reasoned that "[t]he [fourteenth [almendment . . . protects the [rights of]
citizens against the [s]tate itself and all of its creatures-Board of Education not
excepted." Id. at 637.
98 TL.O., 469 U.S. at 335.
99 Id. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (housing officials
must obtain a warrant based on probable cause to conduct a code-enforcement
inspection of a dwelling in the absence of exigent circumstances which would permit immediate entrv); see also Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978)
(Occupational Safety and Health Administration officials require a warrant to enter
private areas within an employment facility in order to inspect for safety hazards
and regulatory violations). The Court in TL.O. emphasized that "it would be
'anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by
the [flourth [aimendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.' " 7'L.O., 469 U.S. at 335 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
530 (1967)).
100 "In loco parentis" is defined as one "[iIn the place of a parent; instead of a
parent; charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties and responsibilities."
BLACK'S LAw DcriONAR' 708 (5th ed. 1979).
il
TL.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37.
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tial intrusion on personal liberty.0'2- The Court reasoned that
this inquiry would determine "the standard of reasonableness
governing any specific class of searches." 0 3 Accordingly, Justice
White explained that in this case the balance was between the
social interest in maintaining discipline within the school and the
student's right to privacy."'
The Court determined that fourth amendment restraints on
government searches must be relaxed in the school environThe Justice reasoned that the warrant requirement is
ment.'
impractical in the school setting because it inhibits the efficiency
of disciplinary procedures.' 0 " Consequently, the Court regarded
the probable cause requirement as unnecessary, 1 7 and concluded that the legality of a student search depends on its reasonableness under the circumstances.'
Utilizing the reasonableness test, the Court held that the
search of T.L.O.'s purse was constitutional.' ' According to the
Justice, Choplick's initial search of T.L.O.'s purse was justified
because her possession of cigarettes was relevant to the charge of
smoking.''o Further, the Court found that the subsequent discovery of rolling papers constituted grounds for reasonable sus102 Id. at 337 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
Justice Brennan advocated ending the Court's analysis by concluding that the
fourth amendment applies to school officials and that the search was extensive. Id.
at 362 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Justice stressed
that "the [flourth [a]mendment's protections should not be defaced by 'a balancing
process that overwhelms the individual's protection against unwarranted official intrusion . . .' " Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 570
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
103 Id. Apparently, the TL.O. Court disregarded probable cause analysis in favor
of the balancing-of-interests test originally featured in Camara and Te?,, to determine a reasonableness standard for school searches. See id.
104 Id. at 339. Justice White pointed out the difficulty in preserving discipline and
order since drug use, violence, and other crimes have created substantial problems
within the schools. Id. See also 1 NATIONAL INST. OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH,
EDUC. AND WELFARE, VIOLENT SCHOOLS, SAFE SCHOOLS:

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

THE SAFE SCHOOL STUDY

(1978). See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 340. Justice White also

noted that "school children may find it necessary to carry . . . legitimate ...

items,

and there is not reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to
privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds." Id. at 339.
105 See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 340. Justice Powell considered the providing of education to be the government's most important function, and he emphasized the need
to protect students. Id. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
'06

Id. at 340.

Id. at 340-41. The Court contended that "[tihe fundamental command of the
Id. at 340.
Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable .
108 Id. at 341.
109 Id. at 343.
1lI Id. at 345.
107
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picion that T.L.O. possessed marijuana, thus allowing the
additional
search
which
revealed
evidence
of drug
involvement. " I
As previous case history indicates, the Supreme Court has
reduced the need for compliance with the warrant clause and
probable cause standard in various situations." 2 In determining
that the underlying meaning of the fourth amendment is that
searches be reasonable, and by applying a balancing-of-interests
test to conclude what is reasonable, the Court created a climate
in which a greater number of searches and seizures will be
deemed acceptable under the fourth amendment. O'Connor v.
Ortega represents the most recent step in that direction. In
O'Connor, the Court addressed whether a public employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in certain work areas, and attempted to ascertain the appropriate standard for searches executed by public employers in places where employees have an
expectation of privacy."'
Justice O'Connor, announcing the judgment of the Court,
observed that searches and seizures by public employers of their
employees' private property are limited by the fourth amendment.'" 4 The Justice, in a plurality opinion, stressed that individuals do not surrender their fourth amendment rights merely
because they are government employees.' ' 5 However, the plurality observed that there are situations where an expectation of
I'' Id. at 347. Justice Brennan failed to accept the majority's reasonable cause
analysis and instead contended that Choplick did not have probable cause to continue his search of T.L.O.'s purse because his suspicion concerning the presence of
marijuana was based exclusively on the discovery of the rolling papers. Id. at 36869 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving border patrols may stop a vehicle and briefly investigate upon reasonable suspicion that the
vehicle may contain illegal aliens); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976) (police officers may stop vehicles at checkpoints located as far as
one hundred miles inside the United States on less than reasonable cause that the
vehicle's occupants are illegal aliens because the checkpoint procedure applies to
all drivers).
''3
See 480 U.S. 709, 711-12 (1987).
114 Id. at 715. Justice O'Connor noted that "it would be 'anomalous to say that
the individual and his private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.' " Id. (quoting Marshall
v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 530 (1967)).
115 Id. at 717. Justice O'Connor authored the plurality opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Powell. Id. at 711. Justice Scalia
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by justice Brennan,
Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens. Id. at 732 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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privacy may be unreasonable." 6 According to the Justice, one
such situation is where a government office is so accessible to
others that an expectation of privacy is unjustified. 'I Thus, Justice O'Connor posited that the reasonableness of an expectation
of privacy will differ according to the type of workplace,'18 and
the issue of whether public employees possess such an expectation must be determined on a case-by-case basis."' The Court
concluded that Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his office, and thus had a right to privacy in his file cabinets and
20
desk.'
The plurality then addressed the need to determine an appropriate standard for searches conducted by a government employer in areas where employees have a reasonable expectation
of privacy.' 2' Justice O'Connor submitted that the reasonableness of a search depends on the context in which it occurs, 22 and
requires balancing employee privacy rights against the need to
2
maintain control and promote efficiency in the workplace. 1
The Justice posited that requiring a search warrant to enter an
employee's office, file cabinets or desk for a work-related purpose
24
is unreasonable because it would inhibit business operations.
Finding public employers are often "entrusted with a tremendous responsibility," Justice O'Connor asserted that "public employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the
work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner.'"125 TheJustice suggested that the delay in entry created by
invocation of the probable cause standard would be inefficient
and detrimental to the public interest.'-2'3 Reasoning that the pri114 Id. The expectations held by public employees, like the expectations of private sector employees, can be diminished by established practices, procedure or by
regulation. Id.
117 Id. at 718.
See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 718.
1 , Id.
118

120) Id. at 718. The evidence indicated that Ortega did not permit others to use
his office equipment and that he was assigned the office for seventeen years where
he kept an array of personal items that were unrelated to hospital affairs. Id.
121 Id. at 719.
122 Id. (citing NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)).
123
124

Id.

Id. at 722. Justice O'Connor emphasized that "the imposition of a warrant
requirement would conflict with 'the common-sense realization that government
offices could not function if every ...decision became a constitutional matter.'
Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
125 Id. at 724.
126 Id. at 723-24. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353. See also Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367 (1987) (reasonable police regulations concerning inventory procedures
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vacy interests of employees were substantially less in the workplace than those found at home, the Justice concluded that the
use of the probable cause standard was unnecessary and would
place "intolerable burdens on public employers."'' 2 7 The Court
held that the invasion of a public employee's privacy interests
should be evaluated by a test of reasonableness for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes and for investigating work-related
misconduct.' 2 8 The Court added that the intrusion must be rea129
sonable in both its inception and scope.
Justice O'Connor concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate because a controversy existed concerning the motive
and scope of the search.' 30 The Justice noted that the decision
below was based on acceptance of the controverted fact that
there was a hospital policy permitting searches to inventory property held by employees on administrative leave.' 3 ' Justice
O'Connor emphasized that the absence of such a policy would
not automatically render the search illegal under the reasonable
cause test.'13 2 The Justice stated that, a search to recover state
property is valid if based on a reasonable belief that there is state
33
property that needs to be secured.1
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion.1 4 He disagreed,
however, with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the extent of
fourth amendment protection in the public workplace is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis.' 3 1 Justice Scalia observed
that the plurality opinion provided neither standards to evaluate
the reasonableness of an employee's expectation of privacy in the
workplace, nor guidelines to establish the creteria for a proper
that are administered in good faith satisfy the fourth amendment); and Illinois v.
Lafayette, 426 U.S. 640 (1983) (warrantless inventory of an individual's personal
effects after arrest and prior to incarceration does not offend the fourth amendment if conducted as part of a routine administrative procedure).
127 O'Contnor, 480 U.S. at 724.
128 Id. at 725-26.
12) Id. at 726. The plurality stated: "The search will be permissible in its scope
when 'the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of. . . the nature of the [misconduct]." Id.
(quoting NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
130 Id. at 726-728. Justice O'Connor noted that the petitioners claimed the
search was executed in accordance with a hospital inventory policy, while respondent asserted that the entry was investigatory in nature. Id. at 727-28.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 728-29.
1'3 3 Id. at 728.
134 Id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'35

Id. at 729-30 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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inquiry.13
Justice Scalia stated that privacy, not solitude, is safeguarded
by the fourth amendment. 3 7 The Justice asserted that constitutional protection against unreasonable searches does not disipate
because a public employer enjoys the privilege of reasonable entry. '3 ' The Justice found that the fourth amendment had been
violated in the case at bar because the office in question was assigned to Ortega
and there were no circumstances requiring im39
entry.'1
mediate
Justice Scalia posited that the issue was whether Napa's
search was reasonable.'4 TheJustice recognized that generally,
warrantless searches violated the fourth amendment, but observed that "special needs" may exist which render warrants and
probable cause unnecessary. 4 ' The Justice reasoned that such
special needs exist for the government employer, who like other
employers, requires access to employee offices for work-related
purposes. 4 2 Justice Scalia concluded that because the evidence
was ambiguous, it could not be shown that the hospital investigators lacked such a valid purpose.' 43" He therefore agreed with the
plurality that the case should be reversed and remanded on that
issue. 144
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun condemned the
plurality's rejection of the warrant and probable cause standard
and its adoption of the reasonableness test.' 45 He contended
136 Id. Justice Scalia stressed that he "object[s] to the formulation of a standard
so devoid of content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty." Id. at 730
(Scalia, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 730.
138 Id. at 731 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
139 Id. at 731-32 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
140 Id. at 732 (Scalia. J., concurring).
141 Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
142 Id. Justice Scalia stated that he "would hold that government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the privateemployer context - do not violate the [fnourth [almendment." Id.
143 Id.
144

Id.

Id. at 741-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun asserted that the
plurality's balancing of employer and employee interests was erroneous. Id. at 743
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He found that despite claiming that its analysis is limited to non-investigatory, work-related intrusions, the plurality has announced a
broad standard applicable to all public employer searches. Id. at 746 (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting). Moreover, the plurality haphazardly arrives at a substitute for probable
cause. Id. No rationale is given for the balancing-of-interests test, thus the plurality
never justifies why probable cause would not adequately safeguard the public em145
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that the Court would only resort to the reasonableness standard
and its balancing test if obtaining a warrant based on probable
cause would defeat the purpose of the search.' 4 6 Justice Blackmun recognized that a public employer is not expected to have a
warrant for each entry into an employee's work area,' 4 7 but asserted that this does not justify rejecting the warrant requirement
for all employer searches.' 4 8 Agreeing with Justice Scalia, he
noted that protection against unreasonable searches "does not
disappear merely because the government has the right [of reasonable intrusion].
Justice Blackmun concluded that there were no special needs
to justify the hospital's failure to comply with the warrant requirement. 50 Observing that the search of Ortega's office was
not for inventory purposes, but, in reality, an investigatory search
which occurred when Ortega was on leave and barred from the
hospital grounds, the Justice reasoned that the hospital officials
had ample time to obtain a warrant.' 5 ' Justice Blackmun asserted
that the grant of partial summary judgment to Ortega was
52
proper.
Justice Blackmun also expressed concern over what he perceived to be the plurality's implicit abandonment ofjudicial scrutiny in favor of a subjective reasonableness standard.15 3 He
asserted that if the hospital officials had been compelled to specify their reasons for the search before a magistrate, this would
have diminished the infringement on Ortega's privacy by
preventing "general rummaging through the doctor's office,
desk, and file cabinets.""' 4 Justice Blackmun concluded that implementation of the reasonableness standard retards the fourth
amendment rights of public employees and curtails scrutiny of
ployer's interest in situations such as the one in O'Connor. Id. at 746-47 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). See also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 363-64 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
146 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 741 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 745 & n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 745 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun pointed out that "[t]he
warrant requirement is perfectly suited for many work-related searches, including
the instant one." Id. (footnote omitted).
14"0Id. at 738 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Scalia on pg 731).
150 Id. at 742-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 742 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 743 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
153 See id. at 743-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun suggested that this was
a significant error because no special need existed that could justify a failure to
apply the warrant probable cause standards. Id. at 744 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 743-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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searches because it allows greater flexibility concerning what is
permissible.'
The plurality failed to address several noteworthy issues
within its opinion. The first of these relates to the special needs
exception to the warrant requirement. Justice O'Connor noted
that the Court has held that the warrant requirement was appropriate only when it "would not 'impose serious burdens on the
inspection system or the courts, [would not] prevent inspections
necessary to enforce the statute or [would not] make them less
effective.' """ She also observed that it would be unrealistic to
expect managers of government institutions to discern the subtleties of the probable cause test.'1 7 In O'Conner v. Ortega, however, adherence to the warrant and probable cause requirements
would not have been unduly burdensome to the hospital investigators since there was no compelling need for immediate entry.' ' Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that obtaining a
warrant would have caused "irreparable damage to the [hospital's] work, and ultimately to the public interest. ' '5t"" Consequently, the Court's application of the balancing test to conclude
that the lack of a hospital policy "did not necessarily make the
search unlawful,"'""' and it serves to liberalize the special needs
test. The plurality has apparently undermined precedents set
forth in Camara "" and Mancusi 1,32 by suggesting that entry into
the office of a government employee by a public offical without a
warrant may be permissible regardless of whether there is reason
for immediate intrusion.'"" Unfortunately, the plurality failed to
outline the parameters of the employer's right to make such
searches. This makes it difficult to distinguish between instances
155

See id. at 746-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

156 Id. at 720 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978)).

See
generally New.Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
157 O'Cotor,480 U.S. at 724-25.
158 See id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15,9Id. at 724. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985) (Blackmun,J.,
concurring).
16) O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 728.
'6'
387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing officials must obtain a warrant based on probable cause to conduct a code-enforcement inspection of a dwelling in the absence
of exigent circumstances which would permit immediate entry). See supra notes 4452 and accompanying text for a discussion of Camara.
1 2 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (warrantless entry by government agents into the office
of a union official and appropriation of documents within that office held unreasonable under the fourth amendment despite that the union refused to comply with a
subpoena issued for these documents. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text
for a discussion of .Mlancusi.
'63 O'Connor, 480 U.S. 709.
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where a special need exists, making warrants superfluous, and
circumstances where compliance with both the warrant and probable cause requirements is necessary.
Justice Blackmun perceived a discrepancy in the plurality's
failure to explain its implementation of a substitute for probable
cause in the workplace.1 6 4 Indeed, the balancing test is applied
without explanation.' 6 5 The plurality failed to elaborate why the
balancing of public employer versus public employee interests
lead to the reasonableness test originally utilized in TL.O.'
The Court also failed to explain its reasons for concluding that
the probable cause standard would be ineffective in protecting
6 7
the public employer given the circumstances in the case at bar.
The Court further created uncertainty through ambiguous
application of the two-prong reasonableness test previously established in Terry.' 6x Because the investigators were aware that
Dr. Ortega had removed his hospital computer, they had no reasonable basis for believing that a search of his office would yield
evidence of misconduct. Consequently, these officials entered
Dr. Ortega's office and seized his property on mere allegations of
improper behavior. Furthermore, this search was excessive as
drawers, cabinets and his desk were opened and his private property was confiscated. 6 "
In concluding that this search may have been reasonable, the
plurality diminished the clarity of the Terry test while providing
no new alternatives. Generally, the plurality advocated an overbroad application of the test that results in a loss of value as a
method of measuring the reasonableness of public employer
searches. Because the inventory purpose of the search was questionable and any investigatory motives were based on unsubstantiated charges, the plurality effectively broadened the inception
concept of the Terry test to the point where its application was
worthless in determining when the execution of a search would
be unreasonable. The plurality also upset the analysis of the
1'4

Id. at 745-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165 See id. at 747 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'66 Id. at 745-47 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). For a discussion of TL.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985). See supra notes 85-111.
'17 O'Conior, 480 U.S. at 746-47 & n.14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 363-64 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168 Terr established that a search will be deemed reasonable if the investigatory
action was justified at its inception, and its scope was appropriate given the events
which initially permitted the interference. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. For a discussion of Terry see supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
169 See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 713.
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scope of the search in Terry by tacitly accepting a.very weak nexus
between the comprehensive nature of the search and the hospital's alleged objective of recovering state property. This allows a
greater number of excessive searches to be deemed reasonable,
and increasingly inhibits consideration of the scope of a search in
determining when a search and seizure is unconstitutional.
Moreover, the plurality decision will create confusion regarding thejudiciary's role monitoring searches and seizures by a
public employer. Camara established that public officials were required to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search of private
areas."1
The plurality decision, however, undermines this practice since it suggests that a warrantless search and seizure of personal property by public officials may be reasonable. 7 '
Consequently, the result is a doctrinal conflict which needs to be
resolved in order to clarify the role of judicial officials in fourth
amendment controversies.
The decision raises questions regarding when a public employee may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the public
workplace. Other Supreme Court decisions have implied that an
individual will have an expectation of privacy in the absence of a
policy allowing government officials to conduct warrantless
searches and seizures. 7 2 O'Connor suggests, however, that it
might have been reasonable for hospital officials to search
Ortega's office and appropriate his property without a warrant
despite the fact that the hospital may have lacked a policy that
would have justified such an entry.' 7' These conflicting principles must be reconciled so that public employees may be better
prepared to comprehend the extent of their privacy rights within
the workplace.
O'Connor v. Ortega may be viewed as another example of the
Supreme Court's propensity to limit individual rights by providing public officials with greater discretion to search and seize
property. By concluding that the search of Ortega's office could
17) For a discussion of Camara see supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
171 See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 728.
172 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (warrantless inventory of an
individual's personal effects after arrest and prior to incarceration does not offend
the lflourth [a]mendment if conducted as part of a routine administrative procedure); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (police inventory of the
contents of an impounded automobile deemed permissible under the [fnourth
[ajmendment since the search was executed in accordance with departmental
procedure).
173 O'Coior, 480 U.S. at 728. Justice O'Connor asserted that "the absence of a
Jhiospital policy did not necessarily make the search unlawful." Id.
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have been reasonable under the circumstances, the Court manifested a desire to diminish the importance of the work-related
and investigatory-purpose exceptions to the warrant requirement.' 7 4 Its broad application of the Teny test implies that
searches of an excessively intrusive degree may be permissible
without authorization.' 7 5 This may tend to reduce fourth amendment protection by permitting a greater number of spontaneous
searches and seizures by public employers.
Furthermore, O'Connor v. Ortega may be viewed as a judicial
attempt to curtail improper activities within the public workplace."7 " The Court's decision is not of great consequence when
taken alone, but when considered in light of other decisions on
search and seizure since Mapp,' 7 7 the opinion reflects a general
insensitivity toward individual expectations of privacy. This attitude should not prevail over the privacy rights granted by the
fourth amendment.
Moreover, the Court's opinion in O'Connor v. Ortega shows a
disregard for precedent and fourth amendment rights because it
condones a broad analysis to determine what is reasonable under
all the circumstances. 171 In so doing, the Court permits an excessively intrusive search and seizure of a public employee's property to be justified by mere allegation. Such searches are not
subject to the warrant and probable cause requirements because
7
they "impose intolerable burdens on public employers."' '
Therefore O'Connor v. Ortega limits fourth amendment protections by granting government employers greater latitude in conducting searches which may impinge upon personal privacy
rights.
M'ichaelJ. Pescatore
174

See id.

175 See id. at 725-28.
176 Justice O'Connor emphasized that "public employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that ... work .. is conducted in a proper and efficient
manner." Id. at 724.
177 For a discussion of .llapp see supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
178 See O'Comio', 480 U.S. at 725-26.
179 See id. at 724.

